

Book Reviews

INHERENT TENSIONS OF CHEMISTRY

ROALD HOFFMANN, *The Same and Not the Same*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, -XVI, 294 pp. (ISBN: 0-231-10138-4)

If you expect a nobel prize winner being a crank who can think of nothing but his subject, then read Roald Hoffmann's *The Same and Not the Same* and test your hypothesis. This book is about chemistry, to be sure – but in the broadest scope including sociology, psychology, ethics and philosophy of chemistry.

51 nice little chapters grouped in ten parts reflect on chemistry from different aspects. Since they neither bore chemists nor deter non-chemists, Hoffmann succeeds in attracting both groups (I will refer to this again).

The underlying idea is that chemistry is not only important and influential in our cultural life, it is also interesting in a very special sense, both for chemists and non-chemists. Instead of presenting a series of smart and admirable achievements of modern chemistry (remember the 18th-century (pseudo-) scientific cabinets), Hoffmann discusses *inherent tensions of chemistry*. Why that? Tensions indicate dynamics, something balanced for the moment between driving forces, something living that attracts our attention, our interest. Miracles and showpieces do also, for sure, but even the laymen gets fed up soon. Tensions, on the other hand, raise our interest more continually. And abstract tensions invite for intellectual discussions to maintain the balance, again and again.

The central topics of Hoffmann's book, the inherent tensions of chemistry, may at best be presented by a list of questions: The ontological ("central") question of identity: In what sense are

chemical substances/molecules the same and not the same? Epistemology: Do chemists discover or do they create new substances and rules. Semiotics: Are chemical signs iconic or symbolic, do they represent the real or the ideal? Philosophy of nature: Are new chemical substances natural or unnatural? Philosophy of science/technology: Is chemistry guided by academic or industrial interest? Ethics: Does chemistry causes utility or harm to the society? Social/ political philosophy: Is risk evaluation subjective or objective, and should political decisions be made according to expertises or to the majority of personal preferences? And among many further questions: Is there a primacy of synthesis or analysis in chemistry? Is chemistry concerned with statics or dynamics? Are chemistry journal articles purely informative and dispassionate or also expressive and impassioned.

All these topics are dealt with in a very sensible way finding a respectable balance that convinced me in most cases (although I do not share the theorist's view, that chemistry is about molecules, not substances). Those who stick to naive extremes will be cured by pointing at each problem's complexity and the diversity of aspects involved. The reader will also find ample references to valuable literature in every chapter.

Since it is impossible to review the perceptive and sensible discussions of all the various topics, I extract a line of practical reasoning running through the book.

Hoffmann emphasizes the creative character of chemistry overlooked by many philosophers of science (chapters 19 ff.). The making of molecules does not only challenge epistemology, questions also arise concerning the distinction between natural and unnatural, its normative aspects, and the chemists' moral

responsibility with regard to their products and knowledge. After pointing out that separating the natural and the synthetic is not that easy as many non-chemists think when condemning the chemical (chapters 22 ff.), he investigates why we all – non-chemists as well as chemists – prefer the natural (chapter 25). Socio-psychologically rooted preferences, values, and emotions do not care much about professions. People who are afraid of chemistry nevertheless use pharmaceuticals in case of serious disease, or they use synthetic fibers without being aware of it. And chemists who praise the benefit of chemistry are nevertheless afraid of pesticides in their own food. By putting his finger on blind spots on either side Hoffmann tries to reveal the complexity of our minds and emotions in order to undermine naive polarizations, especially that of ‘rational chemists’ versus ‘irrational environmentalists’.

Hoffmann also presents two case studies of ethical importance: He gives a detailed and unvarnished analysis of the thalidomide story (chapter 27, in Germany better-known as the ‘Contergan-Fall’), and he unravels the inherent tensions of Haber’s life (chapter 33). The thalidomide story illuminates that although some bad science (bad analytical chemistry and medicine) was involved, the disaster was due to the failure of a more complex system, *i.e.*, an interplay of many careless and half-hearted decisions. In this ethical context, Hoffmann draws two rather radical conclusions. The first one corresponds to a strict reading of the classical principle of medicine ethics, the *primum nil nocere*. He responds to the moral argument that, though being more risky, a less controlled and less restricted drug development would possibly help more people in shorter time: “If there be a calculus of risks and benefits, then the weighting that is applied to a single drug-induced phocomelia birth is (to me) so great that it outweighs any life or hundreds of lives saved.” (p. 137) Hoffmann’s second conclusion relates science to classical trag-

edy: While he holds discovery and creation to be essential for science and even unavoidable (“If you don’t find that molecule, someone else will.” p. 140), he believes that scientists have to take the “absolute responsibility for thinking about the uses of their creation, even the abuses by others” (*ibid.*). Social responsibility of scientists includes the duty to actively inform the public about possible dangers and abuses in advance, even “at the risk of losing their livelihood, at the risk of humiliation” (*ibid.*).

While being aware of the essential ambivalence of science and technology, Hoffmann evaluates their historical contribution to human welfare for the most part positive: “Science and technology have transformed this world, mostly for the better (but with some ill consequences).” (p. 211) And he even thinks “that the overall effect of science is inexorably democratizing, in the deepest sense of the word – by making available to a wider range of people the necessities and comforts that in a previous age were reserved for a privileged elite.” (p. 212) One might object here that a widespread distribution of economical goods is not sufficient for democratizing, for that also requires equal distribution of political rights. Hoffmann makes still another point (quite close to the ideas of French enlightenment): Scientific (chemical) knowledge prevents people from being “alienated”, “impoverished”, feeling “impotent, unable to act” (p. 227). Moreover, “ignorance of chemistry poses a barrier to the democratic process.” (p. 228) “Citizens can call on experts [...]. But experts do not have the mandate; the people and their representatives do. The people have also a responsibility – they need to learn enough chemistry to be able to resist the seductive words of, yes, chemical experts who can be assembled to support any nefarious activity you please.” (*ibid.*) They “must be empowered to make decisions – on genetic engineering or on waste disposal sites, on dangerous and safe factories [...].” (*ibid.*)

Hoffmann stresses the necessity for

better scientific education. But he carefully avoids the fallacies of scientific rationalism and expertocracy. "Much of the world out there is intractable to simplistic (or even complex) scientific analysis. [...] The resolution of personal and societal problems is not achieved by scientific claims that a unique rational solution exists." (p. 220) Instead he emphatically votes for democracy, in which science/chemistry plays a promoting, not controlling role. Technological risk assessment is not sufficient for political decisions. Responsible and viable evaluation of risks requires the empowerment of individuals which "requires access to knowledge and a democratic system of government" (p. 223).

The sketched line of practical reasoning covers only a third of Hoffmann's book. Philosophically interested readers will also find lines of theoretical reasoning of similar depth and sensibleness. They should not be afraid of knowledge barriers. For Hoffmann knows how to introduce the laymen even to more sophisticated topics of chemistry. And he complies with his own conditions of chemistry courses being "attractive, stimulating, intriguing" (p. 228). Since reading the book is also a pleasure because of its narrative style and appealing language, the German translation (*Schein und Sein*, VCH, Weinheim, announced for the end of 1997) will be challenged to transfer this advantage too.

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CHEMISTRY MANAGERS COPING WITH ENVIRONMENTALISTS' CRITICISM

HARTWIG HEINE, RÜDIGER MAUTZ,
WOLF ROSENBAUM, *Öffnung der
Wagenburg? Antworten von
Chemie-Managern auf ökologische
Kritik*, Ed. Sigma, Berlin, 1995, 334
pp. (ISBN: 3-89404-395-4)

Among the sciences, chemistry plays an eminent role in that it has its own traditional industry. The chemical industry is not only the main employer for gradu-

ated chemists. Since the public is more aware of industrial chemistry than of academic chemistry, the industry also represents the public image of the whole profession – and that is terribly bad due to environmental concerns.

The study of Heine et al. carefully investigates the way chemistry managers see themselves in response to public ecological criticism. It intends to find out barriers in the ecological dialogue and to estimate the industry's potential for better future communication. Eighty managers (mostly chemists and engineers and some economics, all of middle or low managerial position, aged between 30 and 55) of two major German chemistry companies have been interviewed about: their own role of protecting the environment, their evaluation of effect, form and content of environmentalists' criticism, the political responsibility of environmental concerns, etc. Unfortunately (but meaningfully?), the companies' boards did not allow the authors to carry out a representative survey among their managers, so that all quantitative results may either be questioned or related to the boards' own perspective.

What makes this piece of sociological work interesting from the philosophical viewpoint? It is an important case study of ethics of science, because it analyses the social role of scientific rationality. To come to the most important and surprising result first, the claim for exclusive rationality – in epistemic and moral respect – seems to be the main barrier of the dialogue with environmentalists, much worse than the company's economical interests (p. 304).

Unlike a widespread prejudice, most of the chemistry managers feel strongly engaged in environment protection, something that covers a great part of their daily work (chapt. I). But most managers strongly reject the form and content of environmentalists' criticism because of irrationality, emotion-charge, lack of knowledge, anti-capitalistic ideology etc. In response to environmentalists' criticism they claim to be the true

environmentalists. On the other hand, a great majority nevertheless consider environmentalists to be influential and even positive in drawing the society's attention to central and otherwise neglected problems. Heine et al. put their finger on this conundrum by analyzing strategies to solve the paradox (chapt. III): While the effect of environmentalists' criticism is generally considered to be helpful in many cases, form and content of criticism is rejected, on the other hand.

The authors figure out a spectrum of four strategies (chapt. IV). At the one extreme they find "absolutists of scientific-industrial reason" (This extreme is exemplified by M. Eilingsfeld, *Der sanfte Wahn – Ökologismus total*, Mannheim 1989; the system-theoretical patron is N. Luhmann, *Ökologische Kommunikation*, Opladen 1986). The position avoids the paradox by neglecting any influence of environmentalists at all. Environment protection is, according to this minority, a purely industrial enterprise that follows an inherent logic of scientific and industrial reason. At the other extreme, there is a minority (mostly economics), who do not maintain any difference in rationality. From the economic view point they consider environmental protection to be rather the outcome of an increased public demand. The vast majority of chemistry managers, however, are located between these extremes. They claim a scientific-industrial rationality that is qualified to some extent by the environmentalists' criticism. Those who maintain the priority of scientific-industrial rationality explain the positive influence of criticism due to few scientific experts among the environmentalists. But there is also a minority that seem to appreciate a pluralism of rationality in society. According to them improvement of environmental protection needs a balance of pure scientific rationality, on one hand, and everyday's rationality including even emotionality, on the other hand.

No wonder that these different groups had different experience when

communicating with the public. Communication barriers increase with the claim for priority of one's own rationality (chapt. V.1). And as one might have expected, along the same line there is an increasing preference for expertocracy with regard to environmental and industrial policy (chapt. V.3). The absolutists of industrial-scientific rationality even reject any political control from outside as irrational and misleading.

Philosophers will miss a more clear-cut definition of 'rationality' in this book; the term is only loosely related to "enlightenment, method, practice and progress" (p. 280). Instead the authors provide three features that chemistry managers themselves consider to be characteristics of their own rationality (pp. 284 ff.): (1) knowledge based on scientific method, free of emotions and prejudices, (2) practice (esp. of environment protection) in correspondence to scientific knowledge, (3) social responsibility (esp. in environmental concerns). It is pointed out that these features (incl. moral authority) are rooted back to early professional ethics of scientists and engineers (p. 288). Hence, the main barrier of ecological dialogue between chemists and the public is the exclusive claim for rationality as part of the professional ethics of chemists.

One might seriously question the special moral authority of chemists, since today's chemistry education even strictly excludes any ethical topic. But the point is more fundamental: While philosophical discourse on modernity and rationality has revised the early ideas of scientific enlightenment long ago, they are still alive in real life. Here, at the frontier, the discourse has hardly begun. On the other hand, this book may serve as a starting point because of its careful and unbiased approach (and the avoidance of sociologists' Chinese). I would appreciate to read also an analogous study of the other side: the rationality of environmentalists.

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